Industry Lobbying and  Interest Blind  Access Norms at International Organizations by Durkee, Melissa J.
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Articles Faculty Publications
2017
Industry Lobbying and "Interest Blind" Access
Norms at International Organizations
Melissa J. Durkee
University of Washington School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Nonprofit Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Melissa J. Durkee, Industry Lobbying and "Interest Blind" Access Norms at International Organizations, 111 AJIL Unbound 119 (2017),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/54
SYMPOSIUM ON INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING
INDUSTRY LOBBYING AND “INTEREST BLIND” ACCESS NORMS AT INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Melissa J. Durkee*
The standard approach of international organizations (IOs) makes no formal distinctions between nonprofit
private sector associations, known as trade or industry groups, and public interest groups like Amnesty
International or Greenpeace. After all, these groups are all organized as nonprofits; they may all be characterized
as nongovernmental organizations representing the interests of their memberships; and the groups all seek to
advance the agendas of members by offering ideas and expertise to international officials or bodies—classic lob-
bying activity. Thus, most IOs offer accreditation and access to both private sector and public interest groups on
equal terms, without differentiating between them. I will call this approach “interest blind” and use this essay to
examine its origins and consequences.
Specifically, the interest blind approach has resulted in robust participation by private sector groups, and their
contributions affect the quality of deliberation at international organizations, and of information that international
lawmakers receive.While there are dangers, a successful reformwill not seek rigid divisions between public interest
and private sector groups, as the World Health Organization has recently tried to do,1 but will instead capture the
informational and practical contributions of all nonstate participants, while introducing more functional registra-
tion and disclosure rules.
Interest Blind Access Rules
TheUnitedNations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) accreditation system offers a seminal example of
how IO access rules work, and has served as a blueprint for other IOs. ECOSOC is empowered by Article 71 of
the UN Charter to “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are
concerned with matters within its competence.”2 ECOSOC has accordingly elaborated regulations enabling
NGOs to become accredited to ECOSOC and agencies or bodies within ECOSOC’s purview.3 Under these reg-
ulations, ECOSOC’s screening of applicants is not focused on determining which interests the association repre-
sents, and whether or not the association’s members are for-profit entities. Rather, the criteria principally focus on
how well the group represents its membership: A successful applicant must be a nonprofit organization, obtain its
funding from its membership, support the United Nations’ work, and demonstrate that it has internal governance
* Assistant Professor at the University of Washington School of Law.
1 World Health Organization [WHO], Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors [hereinafter Framework], WHA69/2016/
REC/1 (May 28, 2016).
2 UN Charter art. 71.
3 See, e.g., UN Econ. & Soc. Council Res. 1996/31 (July 25, 1996) [hereinafter E.S.C. Res. 1996/31].
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structures that make it accountable to its membership.4 These rules do not offer accreditation to individual busi-
nesses, but nonprofit associations advocating for business agendas are eligible.
This interest blind approach did not originate in the United Nations. Rather the United Nations perpetuated the
League of Nations practice, whichmade no distinction between associations that promoted for-profit agendas and
those that promoted gender equality, public health, labor rights, and so forth. To some extent this reflected a pos-
itive view of links between business and commerce and human flourishing.
Now, private sector groups have registered for accreditation in droves. Examples include:
• Global sectoral associations, such as the World Coal Association5 and the World Nuclear Association;6
• Regional sectoral associations, such as theNationalAssociation ofHomeBuilders of theUnited States,7 the
European Association of Automotive Suppliers,8 and the Association of Latin American Railways;9 and
• Generalist organizations, whether global or regional, such as the International Chamber of Commerce,10
the World Union of Small and Medium Enterprises,11 and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen
and Industrialists.12
Indeed, of the approximately 4,600 organizations that are now accredited with consultative status at ECOSOC,13
10 percent self-report “business and industry” as an area of expertise or field of activity.14 Because it relies on
loosely monitored self-reporting, this figure likely underreports the total number of private sector associations.
Many of these organizations have disclosed that their principal organizational purposes include lobbying. For
example, the World Coal Association discloses that it aims to “[a]ssist in the creation of a political climate sup-
portive of action by governments” to use coal technologies, and to educate policymakers about the benefits of coal
and the coal industry.15 The World Nuclear Association “seeks to promote the peaceful worldwide use of nuclear
power.”16 The National Association of Home Builders of the United States seeks to “[b]alance legislative, regu-
latory and judicial public policy.”17
These business-promoting associations work alongside, and on equal terms with, familiar public interest NGOs
like the Sierra Club and Heifer Project International. All of these accredited organizations, public interest and pri-
vate sector alike, enjoy the same potential menu of access privileges. They can send representatives to sit as observ-
ers at meetings of ECOSOC and its commissions and other subsidiary bodies, present written or oral comments,
and otherwise advance their agenda items in various contexts, including by direct lobbying.
4 Id. at para. 2–12. For example, a consultant association must have a democratically adopted constitution, representative process of
governance, and authorized representatives who speak for the membership.
5 See World Coal Association, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
6 See World Nuclear Association, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
7 See National Association of Home Builders of the United States, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
8 See European Association of Automotive Suppliers, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
9 See Association of Latin American Railways, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
10 See International Chamber of Commerce, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
11 See World Union of Small and Medium Enterprises, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
12 See Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
13 See Consultative Status with ECOSOC and other accreditations, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
14 Civil Society Participation Database, DESA, NGO BRANCH (462 organizations selected “business and industry” as of January 2017).
15 See World Coal Association, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
16 See World Nuclear Association, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
17 See National Association of Home Buildes of the United States, DESA, NGO BRANCH.
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The interest blind ECOSOC framework has been replicated around the UN system. Some organizations
have a parallel to Article 71 in their organizational charters, authorizing a consultation system patterned
explicitly on ECOSOC’s.18 Most, following ECOSOC, will accept input from any association that meets min-
imal screening criteria. To be clear, ECOSOC’s model is by no means the only way for IOs to incorporate
outside input. Some IOs do not maintain a standing bench of associational consultants but will instead seek
input from associations they invite to consult at particular decision points.19 Nevertheless, most IOs with
some form of accreditation system admit associations advancing for-profit agendas alongside other NGOs
on equal terms.
Consequences
What are the consequences of this interest blind approach? Commentators in law and political science have
evaluated the legitimacy and appropriateness of offering accreditation to NGOs,20 but these studies have not
tended to focus on the private sector. Elsewhere, in developing such an analysis, I have argued that the rules
both exclude important business contributions and produce an “astroturf activism” phenomenon whereby busi-
nesses covertly use NGOs to advance their agendas.21 But covert activity is only one potential way businesses can
interact with international organizations. Trade and industry groups are overt champions of business positions at
the international level,22 and their activity can affect both the quality of the deliberative process and the quality of
information that international officials and lawmakers receive.
Quality of deliberative process
The benefits of soliciting input fromNGOs and other civil society actors have been broadly observed in domes-
tic literatures on administrative law and in parallel international law literatures,23 and many of these benefits are
equally applicable in the context of private sector groups. In short, the theory is that robust participation by non-
state groups can enhance democratic values in international forums, which are themselves only derivatively dem-
ocratic;24 can offer “input” legitimacy by facilitating more deliberation and a process that incorporates the views of
all potentially affected parties; and can produce greater transparency. Indeed, offering trade and industry groups
opportunities to submit input during a rulemaking process can have additional benefits, enhancing the credibility
18 WHO Constitution art. 71, July 22, 1946, 14 UNTS 185.
19 See e.g., IMF, 2015 Guidelines on the IMF Staff Engagement with Civil Society Organizations.
20 See generally, Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AJIL 348 (2006); see also, PETER WILLETS, NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2011); Kenneth Anderson,
“Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance, Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841 (2011); Steve
Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 891 (2011); Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 161 (2002).
21 See Melissa J. Durkee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201 (2017).
22 For insights from private sector association representatives, thanks to a conference on Industry Associations and Transnational
Governance, organized by the Rutgers Law School Center for Corporate Law and Governance and ASIL’s International Organizations
Interest Group on June 10, 2016.
23 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & David Gartner, Reimagining Participation in International Institutions, 8 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1, 26 (2012);
Daniel Esty,Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing International Law, 155 YALE L. J. 1490 (2006); Bedendict Kingsbury et al., The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 15 (2005); Wendy Wagner, Participation in the U.S. Administrative Process, in
COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION 109 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016).
24 Grainne de Burca, Developing Democracy beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221 (2008).
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of international rules among those private sector constituents, and building support for the rules among national
governments, which may otherwise be subject to disaffected private sector lobbying efforts. Finally, allowing pri-
vate groups access to the rulemaking process potentially can enhance transparency by allowing those groups to
disseminate information about it to their members. In addition to these benefits, Kenneth Abbott and David
Gartner particularly celebrate participation by a mix of groups, or “multiple, countervailing interests—such as
NGOs, business groups, and technical experts,” as a way of balancing the deliberative process.25 Abbott and
Gartner see this diversity as a means of preserving equilibrium and preventing capture of lawmakers by any
one group.
In organizations like UNIDROIT26 and UNCITRAL,27 where rules principally govern private sector interests,
private sector participation is particularly valuable. For example, a private sector association was instrumental in
developing the Cape Town Convention on International Interests inMobile Equipment,28 an important treaty that
standardizes financing for aircraft and other mobile equipment.29 In particular, the Aviation Working Group,30 an
association formed bymarket titans Airbus Industrie31 and the Boeing Company,32 offered significant feedback to
UNIDROIT on the aircraft manufacturing industry’s preferred financing rules, and then later launched a major
campaign encouraging state governments to adopt the convention and offering best practices for
implementation.33
At the same time, private sector participation in IO deliberative processes can heighten existing concerns about
the representativeness of those processes. Commentators, and the United Nations itself, have long been con-
cerned with the overrepresentation of accredited groups from the Global North to the exclusion of voices
from the Global South.34 The participation of private sector organizations representing business interests can
exacerbate these representational disparities. Beyond North-South disparities, there is the balance of influence
between state and nonstate actors at stake. In a recent reform proposal at UNCITRAL, France expressed concern
that overly robust participation by private sector associations threatens “dilution of member state control over the
decision adopted by UNCITRAL.”35 A newWHOFramework of Engagement with nonstate actors airs concerns
about conflicts of interest that may arise when nonstate actors, particularly those affiliated with economic, com-
mercial, or financial interests, unduly influence the WHO’s independence, objectivity, or professional judgment.36
Finally, public-interest NGOs have occasionally expressed surprise and outrage at the idea that industry and trade
25 Abbott & Gartner, supra note 23, at 26.
26 See UNIDROIT.ORG.
27 See UNCITRAL.ORG.
28 See Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 UNTS 285.
29 Sandeep Gopalan, Comment, Harmonization of Commercial Law: Lessons From the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 255, 255 (2003); see also, Roderick A. Macdonald,When Lenders Have Too Much Cash and Borrowers Have Too
Little Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 114 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
30 See AWG.AERO.
31 See AIRBUS.COM.
32 See BOEING.COM.
33 See Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264, 294–95 (2016).
34 E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 3, para. 5; see also, BRUNO SIMMA ET AL., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 912
(1995).
35 Claire R. Kelly, The Politics of Legitimacy in the UNCITRALWorking Methods, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 106, 119
(Tomer Broude et. al. eds., 2011).
36 Framework, supra note 1, Annex, para. 22.
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groups have equal rights, which signals that the interest blind approach can negatively affect the perceived legit-
imacy of an IO’s decisional process.37
In sum, private sector participation can enhance the diversity and legitimacy of IO decisionmaking processes,
but the case is not unequivocal. If regulatory legitimacy arises in part from the trust that the regulated public has in
the process of regulatory decisionmaking, then the presence of private sector consultants has a separate salience
than that of the classic NGOs. It is these classic NGOs that international officials and commentators appear to
have inmind when they laud the surge inNGO accreditations in themid-1990s as a “participatory revolution” and
expression of “global people power.”38
Quality of information
There is clear evidence that, at least in some contexts, private sector associations can enhance the quality of
information available to IO decisionmakers. This can, in turn, affect the quality and effectiveness of the rules
an organization produces. Private sector associations can contribute to a rule’s output legitimacy when they
offer expertise about what legal standards might work in a given situation, what alternatives may be available,
and what potential externalities may arise. For example, as the Cape Town Convention was being developed,
the Aviation Working Group assembled a series of detailed drafts which included extremely technical definitions
of aircraft and aircraft engines, which would have only been available to industry insiders.39 They also proposed
useful default remedies and priority rules, and designed an international online registry to record priority of inter-
ests. Another private sector association, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), suggested an inno-
vative treaty design approach that was ultimately adopted in the final text.40 Finally, the Aviation Working Group
was successful at convincing governmental representatives to adopt a text that would depart in some respects from
legal cultural norms that diverged across civil and common law jurisdictions. In short, commentators conclude
that this private sector association’s participation was “critically important,” and of “inestimable value” to the ulti-
mate success of the treaty.41
At the same time, the WHO’s experience with tobacco association infiltration demonstrates the potential risks
of degradation of information value that flow from the private sector associations when conflicts of interest
between the IO agenda and the private sector agenda arise. Phillip Morris and others engaged in “an elaborate,
well financed, sophisticated, and usually invisible” campaign to discredit and impede theWHO, “hid[ing] behind a
variety of ostensibly independent quasi-academic, public policy, and business organizations,” including “tobacco
company-created front groups and trade unions that had obtained consultative status at the WHO.”42 As one
example among many, the International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA),43 a private sector association
that originally represented a small group of tobacco farmers, came to be controlled by the larger tobacco industry
in order to “serve as a front for [their] third world lobby activities at WHO,” to “undermineWHO tobacco control
activities.”44
37 WILLETS, supra note 20, at 27 (2011).
38 KofiAnnan, Secretary-General, Press Release, Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing Global Agenda, Says Secretary-
General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks, UN Press Release SG/SM/7318 (Feb. 29, 2000).
39 Durkee, supra note 33, at 295.
40 See IATA.ORG.
41 Roy Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree: The Development of the Cape Town Convention and Protocols, 17 UNIF. L. REV. 599, 603 (2012).
42 WHO, Tobacco Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the WHO [hereinafter TCS Report] 25 (2000).
43 See TOBACCOLEAF.org.
44 TCS Report, supra note 42, at 48.
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Reforms
The classic interest-blind UN approach to NGOs opens the accreditation process to a pluralistic contest of
values and welcomes valuable private sector contributions, but it does not resolve potential legitimacy and con-
flicts-of-interest challenges. In some IOs, those challenges have become acute, prompting the IOs to rethink this
interest-blind model.
For example, in summer 2016, the World Health Assembly adopted a new Framework of Engagement,45 which
establishes separate rules for theWHO’s interactions with two distinct groups: “non-governmental organizations”
and “private sector entities and international business associations.” The explanation for this divergence from the
classic interest blind approach is historical: it responds to the WHO’s embattled history with private sector influ-
ences.46 For this reason, the rules for private sector entities seek to guard against conflicts of interest and negative
impacts on “WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation; and public health mandate.”47 The inno-
vative reform flows from an ex ante normative judgment about benefits and risks that attach to private sector
participation. What the reform misses, however, is that erecting categorical distinctions for the purpose of balanc-
ing representation or quashing conflicts of interest may send some business interests underground—reducing,
rather than enhancing, transparency. Moreover, the reforms are likely to overburden already taxed gatekeepers,
resulting in application backlogs, incapacity to meaningfully screen applicant associations, and accidental admis-
sion of noncompliant groups. Strikingly, under the WHO Framework, officials are charged with independently
assessing whether an associationmay harbor any private sector influences that could potentially cause undue influ-
ence over WHO officials and state delegates. This imposes a formidable burden on those institutional gatekeepers
in an era whereNGOs often have close links and partnerships with the corporate world, and where business actors
seek all potential avenues to influence transnational ordering.
A better course may be for IOs to stop examining a group’s accountability to its membership, as the ECOSOC
approach requires, and to refrain from attempts to police a group’s motives, as the WHO reform does. Rather, a
better reform might accept input from all sources, presuming that groups will advance a diversity of special inter-
ests, some profit motivated, and some unrelated to profit. Potential conflicts-of-interest issues could be mitigated
by a structured process drawing from domestic models such as U.S. notice-and-comment procedures or lobbying
laws requiring disclosures and implementing other protections.48
45 Framework, supra note 1.
46 TCS Report, supra note 42, at iii., 7, 25.
47 Id. at Annex, para. 7(a), (c).
48 For further development of this idea, see Melissa J. Durkee, International Lobbying Law, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2018).
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